00904nas a2200121   4500000000100000008004100001260001500042100001600057245004100073856007100114520058300185022001400768       2023                            d  c2022-11-041 aDaniel Arce00aCybersecurity For Defense Economists  uhttps://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10242694.2022.21381223 aThis study introduces cybersecurity concepts in ways familiar to defense economists and identifies parallel methods of analysis in the fields. The theoretical tools of both fields include microeconomics and game theory. These tools enable analyses of phenomena present in both milieus: public goods, externalities, commons, incentives, interdependent security, platform economics, and inefficiency of decentralized decision making. Additional topics include cyber war, cyberterrorism, deterrence and disinformation in cyberspace, price of anarchy, and economics of cryptography.  a1024-2694