While the 2024 edition of the Global Cybersecurity Outlook highlighted the growing inequity in cyberspace, this year’s report shines a light on the increasing complexity of the cyber landscape, which has profound and far-reaching implications for organizations and nations.

Using the Canadian research and policy context as case study, this paper will first, examine the governance mechanisms currently in place to mitigate the negative implications of dual-use research and innovation; second, compare these with other relevant international governance contexts; and finally, propose some ways forward (i.e. a risk analysis approach) for developing more robust governance mechanisms.

This article explores the emerging security governance of knowledgeable practices in life sciences and critically reflects on its possible implications. The article first contextualizes the current understanding of the dual-use dilemma in life sciences in prior discourse on science–security relations and argues that security concerns have converged with ethical dilemmas related to the governing of science. Drawing on critical theory, security studies and science studies, it then conceptualizes dual use as a problem of organizing circulations and suggests that policing scientific knowledge through the establishment of a ‘culture of responsibility’ can be understood as a part of broader shifts towards the subjectification of knowledge. Using examples from life sciences, the article analyses how practices of knowledge production and circulation are adjusted to the logic of security.

Product Development of military and non-military become a must choice by defense industry to endure in facing challenge on need of unsustainable military product. If a defense industry only depends on production of military product, there is risk that defense industry will experience point of saturated. In overcoming the problem, the defense industry must own the function as Dual Use between defense sector and economy sector. Defense industry in increasing its independence uses the proposed strategy to reach the economy scale from its own manufactured products. This study aim to analyze the contribution opportunity of government strategy in supporting the development of military and non-military product (Dual Use Technology) on defense industry in Indonesia.

I explore reasons why existing defense has failed to prevent cyber attacks on critical infrastructure. I study one of the least studied notions of cyberspace behavior known as target distinction. Drawn from customary international law, the principle posits that states should tell their wartime targets between combatants and noncombatants and use force only toward military objects. States should not target critical infrastructure, like gas pipelines, because to do so harms civilian populations who use it. I investigate four issues that keeps the principle from preventing attacks on critical infrastructure. The first is its inability to capture the networked nature of critical infrastructure beyond the simple dual-use (military and cyber) purposes. The second defect is the interpretive confusion that the principle generates over the rules of engagement. The third problem is the omission from its coverage of actors other than nation states. By design, the principle condones cyber attacks by nonstate actors on infrastructure, or by those whose linkage to state sponsors cannot be legally established. Finally, the principle is prone to fail when hackers lack proper understanding of what it does and does not allow. © 2023 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group.