The advent of cyber warfare exacerbates the risk of inadvertent nuclear escalation in a conventional conflict. In theory, cyber espionage and cyberattacks could enhance one state's ability to undermine another's nuclear deterrent. Regardless of how effective such operations might prove in practice, fear of them could generate escalatory “use-‘em-before-you-lose-‘em” pressures.Additionally, cyber threats could create three qualitatively new mechanisms by which a nuclear-armed state might incorrectly conclude that its nuclear deterrent was under attack. First, cyber espionage could be mistaken for a cyberattack. Second, malware could accidentally spread from systems that supported non-nuclear operations to nuclear-related systems. Third, an operation carried out by a third party could be misattributed by one state in a bilateral confrontation to its opponent. Two approaches to risk reduction are potentially viable in the short term: unilateral restraint in conducting potentially escalatory cyber operations, and bilateral or multilateral behavioral norms.

this tutorial is particularly interesting and distinct from these positions because it examines in detail the experience of leading foreign countries in creating cyber forces, national structures that ensure cyber security at the state level, and national units for ensuring the security of critical infrastructure facilities, as well as the requirements of international, supranational regulatory legal acts, standards, and guidelines in the field of regulating critical infrastructure facilities.The book also covers such important issues as preventive measures, strategy development, implementation of crisis management, risk management at critical infrastructure facilities, including risk-oriented approaches to critical infrastructure used in world-leading countries, features of conducting an audit of critical information infrastructure, etc. An attempt has been made to define the mission, goals, and objectives of ensuring security and sustainability for critical infrastructure as an
important component of the national security of a state.

While the rules of the jus in bello are generally operative in cyberspace, it appears to be problematic to apply the fundamental principle of distinction because of the systemic interconnection of military and civilian infrastructure in the cyber realm. In this regard, the application of the accepted legal definition of military objectives will make various components of the civilian cyber infrastructure a legitimate military objective. In order to avoid serious repercussions for the civilian population that might follow from this inherent interconnectedness, different concepts are analysed that could provide potential solutions for a clearer separation of legitimate military targets and protected civilian installations and networks.

Cyber-technology is a new and emerging area of dual use concern. Consider autonomous robots. On the one hand, autonomous robots can provide great benefits, e.g. providing for the health and safety of elderly invalids. On the other hand, autonomous robots have the potential to enable great harm, e.g. weaponised autonomous robots (so-called ‘killer robots ’). As we have seen, the intended great harm is typically delivered by a weapons system of some sort, e.g. chemical, nuclear or biological weapons. Cyber-technology is apparently no different in this respect since, after all, there are so-called cyber-weapons, such as the Stuxnet virus used to shut down Iranian nuclear facilities. In this chapter the definition of dual use technology elaborated in Chap. 2 is modified in light of some distinctive properties of cyber-technology.

This study employs a controlled randomized survey experiment design to test the effect of exposure to lethal and nonlethal cyberattacks on support for different types of cybersecurity policies. One thousand twenty-two Israeli participants are exposed to scripted and simulated television reports of lethal or nonlethal cyberattacks against national infrastructure.

The Cybercrime Atlas community uses open-source research to create new insights into the cybercriminal ecosystem.
Cybercrime Atlas participants use this research to disrupt cybercrime and mitigate the impact of cyber attacks.
The Cybercrime Atlas is hosted at the World Economic Forum's Centre for Cybersecurity.

That’s why this report focuses on the eight cybercrime trends for 2024 and provides security best practices to better prepare against this diverse array of cyber threats. Security best practices checklist

Focuses on defense strategies to enhance the security of a system.

this article argues that in the emerging democracies, the military is on its way to being the dominant force controlling cyber centres or commands emulating those already established in the global North.

How do we interpret current cybersecurity and cyber defence affairs beyond what we know from the advanced democracies and industrialised states? This article argues that in the emerging democracies, the military is on its way to being the dominant force controlling cyber centres or commands emulating those already established in the global North.