Product Development of military and non-military become a must choice by defense industry to endure in facing challenge on need of unsustainable military product. If a defense industry only depends on production of military product, there is risk that defense industry will experience point of saturated. In overcoming the problem, the defense industry must own the function as Dual Use between defense sector and economy sector. Defense industry in increasing its independence uses the proposed strategy to reach the economy scale from its own manufactured products. This study aim to analyze the contribution opportunity of government strategy in supporting the development of military and non-military product (Dual Use Technology) on defense industry in Indonesia.

I explore reasons why existing defense has failed to prevent cyber attacks on critical infrastructure. I study one of the least studied notions of cyberspace behavior known as target distinction. Drawn from customary international law, the principle posits that states should tell their wartime targets between combatants and noncombatants and use force only toward military objects. States should not target critical infrastructure, like gas pipelines, because to do so harms civilian populations who use it. I investigate four issues that keeps the principle from preventing attacks on critical infrastructure. The first is its inability to capture the networked nature of critical infrastructure beyond the simple dual-use (military and cyber) purposes. The second defect is the interpretive confusion that the principle generates over the rules of engagement. The third problem is the omission from its coverage of actors other than nation states. By design, the principle condones cyber attacks by nonstate actors on infrastructure, or by those whose linkage to state sponsors cannot be legally established. Finally, the principle is prone to fail when hackers lack proper understanding of what it does and does not allow. © 2023 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group.

As a result of the extensive integration of technology into the healthcare system, cybersecurity incidents have become an increasing challenge for the healthcare industry. Recent examples include WannaCry, a nontargeted ransomware attack on more than 150 countries worldwide that temporarily crippled parts of the National Health Service in the United Kingdom, and the 2016 ransomware attack on Los Angeles's Hollywood Presbyterian Medical Center. The attacks cost millions of dollars in lost revenue and fines, as well as significant reputational damage. Efforts are needed to devise tools that allow experts to more accurately quantify the actual impact of such events on both individual patients and healthcare systems as a whole. While the United States has robust disaster preparedness and response systems integrated throughout the healthcare and government sectors, the rapidly evolving cybersecurity threat against healthcare entities is outpacing existing countermeasures and challenges in the "all-hazards" disaster preparedness paradigm. Further epidemiologic research of clinical cybersecurity attacks and their effects on patient care and clinical outcomes is necessary to prevent and mitigate future attacks. © Copyright 2020, Mary Ann Liebert, Inc., publishers.

This research seeks to provide new a better understanding of OCO and their impact on civilian organizations. To highlight this domain, the case of the threat actor Advanced Persistent Threat 1 (APT1) is presented, and its impact on three civilian organizations discussed. Semi-structured interviews were used to research how the threats from OCO and state-sponsored actors are perceived by civilian organizations. First, a computational literature review was used to get an overview of related work and establish question themes. Next, the question themes were used to develop questions for the interview guide, followed by separate interviews with five security professionals working in civilian organizations. The interviews were analysed using thematic coding and the identified themes summarized as the result of this research.

why cybersecurity needs better measurement for risks, evolving the model of cybersecurtity risk

Emerging scientific frontiers in genome editing and brain - computer interfaces (BCIs) promise unparalleled advancements in human health and cognitive capacities. Genome editing, with its potential to modify genetic sequences, might one day enhance traits including cognitive function. Concurrently, BCIs, enabling direct brain-device interplay, present prospects in cognitive enhancement such as amplified memory or learning rates. Yet, as the horizons of these technologies expand, so too do the ethical quagmires, chiefly, the dual-use dilemma in cognitive warfare. There is potential for these technologies to uplift society, offering enhanced cognitive abilities and a new echelon of human capability.

In this paper, we introduce some ways of how cybersecurity incidents are managed in the military environment; in addition, we describe the main requirements towards humans in milCERTs and how these requirements differentiate from civilian CERTs. Further on, we highlight the institutional background of Hungary’s cybersecurity training, specifically underlining the role of National University of Public Service in it, which is responsible for the education of all public servants, including cadets. The paper also focuses on the major challenges and some suggestions from Academia how to respond to them by building successful teams for the protection of national cyberspace.

Humans are often considered to be the weakest link in the cybersecurity chain. However, traditionally the Computer Science (CS) researchers have investigated the technical aspects of cybersecurity, focusing on the encryption and network security mechanisms. The human aspect although very important is often neglected. In this work we carry out a scoping review to investigate the take of the CS community on the human-centric cybersecurity paradigm by considering the top conferences on network and computer security for the past six years.

Recommendations from the workshop discussion included concrete suggestions both for the military and for the private sector to do more to streamline a warfighter’s experience from before entering the service all the way through to transitioning to a new civilian cybersecurity
career.

This project investigates civilians’ vulnerabilities through four
cyber-attacks: (1) the Anthem health insurer cyber-attack in the United States, (2) WannaCry ransomware on the National Health Service in the United Kingdom, (3) the Jasmine Revolution cyber-attacks in Tunisia, and (4) the 2010 Natanz uranium enrichment facility cyber-attacks in
Iran.