Cybersecurity has become as crucial as conventional security, thereby shifting the realm of the security environment. Rogue actors have
boosted their capabilities, and the costs of such resources owned by attackers are threatening security on both sides of the Atlantic. NATO must put forward recommendations and implement the securitization agenda in order to create an interconnected approach within different sectors. NATO will need to continue building the forcemultiplying functions of its cyber capabilities, improve effective command and decision-making structures in cyber crisis and conflicts, and enhance the interoperability between allies and partners in cyberspace. The security challenges of today require quick responses, necessitating flexible policy frameworks that allow for coercive reactions from networked actors.

Westphalian state system has been deeply affected from the civilianization of the cyber space. It is possible to see the traces of nuclear war and its competition in this new post-Cold War period. The contemporary threats against the cyber space and their vague boundaries could clearly be seen in the examples. Cyber attacks in this new security environment towards long lasting alliance NATO and its members are giving important clues for the future. In this article, one discussed defensive measures of NATO for these new threats and the process, which determined the cyber security strategies. Upon this cyber defense strategy, NATO tries to level the cyber capabilities of its members and takes the necessary steps to achieve this goal. The Lisbon summit endorsed the preparation of a new strategy that includes cyber defense and protection of the critical information infrastructure.

Cybersecurity faces rising challenges from advanced threats, geopolitical tensions, and technological complexities. The 2024 CrowdStrike glitch and shifting internet policies highlight the urgency of resilience, risk management, and global strategies. Here’s what experts say about the cybersecurity trends that will shape economies and societies in the near future.

This Innovate Practice Full Paper presents a new game for cybersecurity learning. Cybersecurity education is critical to personal media consumption, privacy protection, and national infrastructure. We live in a world that is increasingly connected; the majority of people, particularly young people, engage with technology and social media for multiple hours per day, using the internet as a source of news, entertainment, and connection to the outside world. However, threats on the internet, including misinformation, disinformation, phishing, and multiple other cybersecurity threats grow each year. Because of this, cybersecurity is an essential skill for K-12 and all undergraduate students to learn in public schools. In this study, we asked K-12 teachers to analyze a specific game, NetDefense, designed to teach students basic cybersecurity concepts related to networking.

Cybersecurity poses new questions for old alliances. These questions emerge with special force in the case of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The Russian Federation wields substantial cyber capabilities, but NATO members have been ambivalent about stating what sorts of attacks would trigger the North Atlantic Treaty's Article 5 collective self-defense provisions. Nevertheless, NATO officials state that there are some attacks that would trigger Article 5. This leads to a puzzle: why would an explicit alliance guarantee designed to ensure collective defense against certain forms of attack be informally extended to include others? Because the policy of the United States toward such questions will likely be of great significance in determining NATO policy, we use a series of survey experiments to test American public opinion regarding support for defending allies and friendly countries against cyber operations. Respondents are likelier to support a response to an attack that causes fatalities and when the victim has a treaty alliance with the United States. In contrast, support falls if US participation is likely to provoke further retaliation or the target attacked is civilian rather than military. © 2022 The Author(s) (2022). Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the International Studies Association.

The failure of the government to provide adequate protection has led
many cybersecurity analysts, scholars, and policymakers to suggest
that there is a need for private-sector self-help. If the government is unable or unwilling to take or threaten credible offensive actions to deter cyberattacks or to punish those who engage in them, it may be incumbent upon private-sector actors to take up an active defense. In other words, the private sector may wish to take actions that go beyond protective software, firewalls, and other passive screening methods—and instead actively deceive, identify, or retaliate against hackers to raise their costs for conducting cyberattacks. Taking into consideration U.S.,foreign, and international law, the U.S. should expressly allow activedefenses that annoy adversaries while allowing only certified actors to engage in attribution-level active defenses. More aggressive active defenses that could be considered counterattacks should be taken only by law enforcement or in close collaboration with them

The spectrum of current threat vectors is far more complex now than ever before. The current threat vectors are kinetic, asymmetric, dual-use, and hybrid, which renders it difficult to assess and, even, distinguish from a routine event. The threats not only jeopardize the security posture but also cyber defense capabilities, the very line of defense that is designed to protect against such threats. Countering threat vectors in multiple domains, viz., social, physical, and informational, is a major challenge and requires technology augmentation to assess, act and thwart such persistent and pervasive threats.

This report aims at providing policy makers with evidence to assess the effectiveness of the existing EU cybersecurity framework specifically through data on how the NIS Directive has influenced cybersecurity investments and overall maturity of organisations in scope. As 2024 is the year of the transposition of NIS 2, this report also intends to capture a pre-implementation snapshot of the relevant metrics for new sectors and entities in scope of NIS 2 to help future assessments of the impact of NIS 2.

The addition of the Prepare step is one of the key updates to the Risk Management Framework (NIST Special Publication 800-37, Revision 2 [SP 800-37r2]). The Prepare step was incorporated to achieve more effective, efficient, and cost-effective security and privacy risk management processes. Tasks in the Prepare step directly support subsequent RMF steps and are largely derived from guidance in other NIST publications or are required by Office of Management and Budget (OMB) policy (or both). Thus, organizations may have already implemented many of the tasks in the Prepare step as part of organizationwide risk management. The Prepare step intends to reduce complexity as organizations implement the Risk Management Framework, promote IT modernization objectives, conserve security and privacy resources, prioritize security activities to focus protection strategies on the most critical assets and systems, and promote privacy protections for individuals. The organization- and system-level risk management activities conducted in the Prepare step are critical for preparing the organization to execute the remaining RMF steps. Without adequate risk management preparation at the organizational and system levels, security and privacy.

Security and privacy controls are the safeguards and countermeasures employed within an organizational system to protect the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the system and its information, as well as the privacy of individuals. Selecting and implementing the appropriate controls for a system are important tasks that can have major implications on the operations and assets of an organization, as well as the welfare of individuals and the Nation.