Most research in defence centres on big NATO nations, while much less focus has been given to smaller NATO nations. The paper explores this issue. First, the author redefines the term 'small NATO nations' and introduces a new idea: 'no-capability NATO nation'. Then, the author conducts a systematic literature review on defence acquisition (DA). From 122 records, only five are found to relate to small NATO nations. Moreover, the identified literature is US-dominated and EU concerns prevail over NATO concerns.

This article analyzes the attempts to construct global cybersecurity norms. It differs from much of the existing literature on norm-construction since it moves beyond the interstate level to examine subnational groups and private sector actors that function as norm entrepreneurs in this policy area.

Many of these potential uses raise important social and ethical questions which demand the attention of all those involved in the research, administration, management and regulation of neuroscience research and related technological developments, including those in information and communication technologies (ICT) and robotics. In this Opinion, we suggest that we can increase our ability to identify which programmes and projects of research, development and innovation are ‘of concern’ by applying the principles of Responsible Research and Innovation (RRI) to the concept of ‘dual use’ and distinguishing between ‘responsible’ and ‘irresponsible’ systems of research and technological development. We therefore use the term ‘dual use research of concern’ (DURC) to refer to neuroscience research and technological innovations, and brain inspired developments in information and communication technologies, for use in the political, security, intelligence and military domains, which are either directly of concern because of their potential for use in ways that threaten the peace, health, safety, security and well-being of citizens, or are undertaken without responsible regard to such potential uses.

This article explains the origins and institutionalisation of cyber security in Australia—particularly ‘civilian cyber security’. The authors trace the origin of Australia’s first computer emergency response team and explain how this organisational form spread from the USA. Through it, Australia helped enable international cooperation. Domestically, however, the authors argue that the Australian government has struggled with the delegation, orchestration and abdication of responsibility for civilian cyber security, underinvesting in civilian organisations while overrelying on military and intelligence agencies. The history of this organisational field provides valuable insight into how to improve national policy and operations for cyber security.

this paper seeks to identify if the national cybersecurity centres appear to be successful

IS literature has identified various economic, performance, and environmental factors affecting cybersecurity investment decisions. However, economic modeling approaches dominate, and research on cybersecurity performance as an antecedent to investments has taken a backseat. Neglecting the role of performance indicators ignores real-world concerns driving actual cybersecurity investment decision-making. We investigate two critical aspects of cybersecurity performance: breach costs and breach identification source, as antecedents to cybersecurity investment decisions. We use organizational learning to theorize how performance feedback from these two aspects of cybersecurity breaches influences subsequent investment decisions. Using firm-level data on 722 firms in the UK, we find that higher breach costs are more likely to elicit increases in cybersecurity investments. This relationship is further strengthened if a third party identifies the breach instead of the focal firm. We contribute to the literature on cybersecurity investments and incident response.

over the past two decades, China has adopted a policy of augmenting its information warfare (IW) capabilities by leveraging the civilian sector (notably private institutions, academia, and civilian government institutions). This paper provides a broad survey of China’s cyber auxiliary capabilities and assesses how China uses its civilian economy as a “strategic reserve” in all four areas of the Information Domain.

In this paper, we present PocketCTF, an extensible and fully independent CTF platform, open to educators to run realistic virtual labs to host cybersecurity exercises in their classrooms. PocketCTF is based on containerization technologies to minimize the deployment effort and to utilize less system resources.

Over the last few years, the international community has devoted much attention to the topic of "international cyber norms". However, there appears to be a fundamental tension between these norm-development efforts and their real-world application as effective tools to reduce cyber risk and deter or prevent malicious state and non-state actors. Furthermore, in the current geopolitical climate, a broad agreement on global cyber norms seems improbable, as suggested by the lack of consensus in the course of the UN GGE 2017 process. In the meantime, government officials tasked with developing and deploying cybersecurity policy and law face day-to-day challenges and are operating on a different track. Questions continuously arise with respect to the role of the state in formulating cybersecurity standards, information sharing, active defense and privacy protection. These questions are dealt with mostly in the "civilian" cybersecurity sphere and are occurring largely under the radar of the global "international cyber norms" community. Against this backdrop, the paper suggests a shift in the approach to cyber norms. Its central thesis is that, at this juncture, rather than attempting to create a set of pre-defined aspirational norms aimed at achieving global stability, the international community should pay greater attention to discussions that are already occurring between cybersecurity regulators/authorities and should proactively support such discussions.

In hybrid conflicts of any intensity, hostilities (operations) are an element of other (non-force) actions mutually coordinated according to a single plan, mainly economic, political, diplomatic, informational, psychological, cyber, cognitive, etc. This creates destabilizing internal and external processes in the state that is the object of aggression (concern and discontent of the population, migration, acts of civil disobedience, etc.). The article examines the effective organizational and technical countermeasures against hybrid threats, national cyber defense systems in the developed countries. The article also presents the results of the investigations into the effects of the information hybrid threats through cyberspace on social, technical, socio and technical systems. The composition of the system of early efficient detection of the above hybrids is proposed. The results of the structural and parametric synthesis of the system are described. The recommendations related to the system implementation are given. A number of sufficient components for the effective design and development of the national cyber defense system of the state are proposed. © 2022. All Rights Reserved.